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There and Back Again, a Smuggler’s Tale: Hawala and Money Laundering in the
Greater Philadelphia Area
By: David Marshall Block

Abstract:
This paper seeks to explain the extralegal contractual relations governing Hawala and
other related informal financial transfer systems (IFTS). Hawala, and other IFTF’s, have
faced a regulatory onslaught in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, as
well as competitive pressures from traditional money transfer systems. Despite these
competitive pressures, IFTS’s still occupy a major market position in the money transfer
market place, in particular amongst Asian and African immigrant communities in the
Western world. Two recent academic papers have theorized what governs the extralegal
contractual relations of Hawala, but no literature has been developed based on a case
study to confirm these theories. This paper seeks to outline what governs the contractual
relations of cross-border Hawaladars by interviewing IFTS brokers in the greater
Philadelphia area. This Paper will be broken into four parts: Part I will analyze what
Hawala is and how it works, Part II will analyze how Hawala works in practice based on
a case study of Hawaladars in the Greater Philadelphia area, Part III will analyze why
Hawala still exists & Part IV will be a conclusion analyzing the future of Hawala.

“Illegal is Always Faster”
- Eoin Colfer

Introduction
A middle-aged man, let’s assume from Bangladesh, enters his local community
grocery store in West Philadelphia, takes out $600 in cash and hands it to the cashier. The
cashier, also the owner of the small store, puts the cash in his register and records the
deposit by pencil in his private books. The depositor receives a small slip as a receipt and
leaves. The broker places a call to his cousin, another grocer in Dhaka, and takes out a
$20 fee from the $600. The depositor’s mother picks up 45,000 Taka the next day in
downtown Dhaka. There is no government record of the transfer in either the United
States or Bangladesh 1. The system that allows this movement of money rapidly,
discreetly and cheaply is called Hawala. This paper will explore who operates Hawala,
how it operates and why such a simple and ancient form of money transfer continues to
exist in the 21st century.

Part I: What is Hawala?
What is Hawala and where did it come from?
The word Hawala comes from Arabic, and has various translations including:
“assignment, change, transform or promissory note”. 2 Hawala is defined by the

1

I watched the first part of this transaction occur during one of my visits to a Hawala broker’s store.
Rachana Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating Hawala: A Cultural Norm or a Terrorist Hotbed, 27
Fordham Int’l L.J. 2007, 2010 (2007)

2

2

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) as a “parallel remittance system,” that
exists outside of “ ‘traditional’ banking or financial channels.” 3
There is substantial debate over the origin of Hawala. Some scholars have argued
that similar money transfer systems have independently appeared across the pre-modern
world in societies as diverse as China (the fei ch’ien), Latin America and Southeast
Asia. 4 Others, most prominently Schramm & Taube, have argued that a predecessor of
Hawala emerged out of economic necessity during the 10th century in the Islamic world. 5
Currency shortages coupled with widely dispersed trade routes unsafe for travel with gold
or silver necessitated the development of a system of finance. The “evolution of an
institutional solution to the problem of coordinating economic interaction was decisively
influenced and strongly guided by the Koran’s moral directives as to how business was to
be conducted.” 6 Hawala, which complies with Islam’s restrictions on usury and lending,
filled the economic void. 7

3

Patrick M. Jost & Harjit Singh Sandhu, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money
Laundering, Report prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in cooperation with
INTERPOL/FOPAC, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf
4
See Pathak at 10, citing Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances: An International Comparison, (InterAmerican Dev. Bank, Working Paper Feb. 2003, at 2)(arguing that similar money transfer systems have
developed independently throughout human history in widely differing civilizations).
5
Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and institutional foundation of the Hawala financial
system, Int’l R. Fin. Analysis (2003)
6
Id.
7 But see Edwina A. Thompson, Misplaced Blame: Islam, Terrorism and the Origins of Hawala, 11 Max
Planck Y.B. U.N.L. 279 (2007) (suggesting that the origins of Hawala may date back to the pre-Islamic
period in the Arab world, as the practice of “al-hawala” was already recognized during the time of the
Prophet Mohammed in the 7th century); see also Divya Sharma, Historical Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural
Understanding, and Criminal Abuses of Hawala, 16.2 Int’l Crim. J. 99-121 (2006) (proposing that Hawala
in its contemporary form is a more recent phenomenon dating back only “seven or eight decades” and is
better seen as an offshoot of its’ close relative Hundi, a related financial transfer system dating back to at
least the 12th century on Indian subcontinent. Operationally, the two systems are similar, but there is less
evidence that Hundi is rooted in either Islamic law or culture)

3

How does Hawala work?
Adil Anwar Daudi outlines a typical Hawala transaction to explain how the
system works. According to Daudi,
“A remittance [comes] from a customer (CA) from Country A, or a payment
arising from some prior obligation, to another customer (CB) in Country B.
[There] a Hawaladar from Country A (HA) receives funds in one currency from
CA and, in return, gives CA a code for authentication purposes. He then instructs
his country B correspondent (HB) to deliver an equivalent amount in the local
currency to a designated beneficiary (CB), who needs to disclose the code to
receive the funds. HA can be remunerated by charging a fee or through an
exchange rate spread. After the remittance, HA has a liability to HB, and the
settlement of their position is made by various means, either financial or goods or
services. Their positions can also be transferred to other intermediaries, who can
assume and consolidate the initial positions and settle at wholesale or multilateral
levels.” 8

Daudi proceeds to explain the importance of trust between the two Hawaladars in the
example as well as the trust between Hawaladar and customer. There is no exchange of
receipts between the Hawaladars, or between the Hawaladars and the customer. Daudi
claims that a breach of either relationship is punished by ex-communication and a “loss
of honor.” 9
Nikos Passas outlines a similar Hawala transaction but highlights Hawala as
having two main distinguishable aspects: (1) the sending and receiving of money and (2)
the settlement process. 10 The first aspect, according to Passas, is “simple and
straightforward” while the second is “complex.” 11 In the settlement process, each time a
Hawaladar sends payment, he creates a debt. Closer relationships, according to Passas,
8

Adil Anwar Daudi, Invisible Bank: Regulating the HAWALA System in India, Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates, The, 15 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 619, 654 (2004-2005)
9
This idea of social and economic excommunication is common in the literature, but there are very few
citations to any instances of this excommunication.
10
Nikos Passas, Demystifying Hawala: A look into its social organization and mechanics, 7.1 J.
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention. 46,52 (2006)
11
Id.
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make the settlement easier. For Hawala to operate optimally, “there must be pools of
cash or funds on both ends of the transactions.” 12 This can be difficult when one country,
such as the US, is labor importing, while another country, such as Pakistan, may be cash
importing. These asymmetrical flows require a balancing through either a third party or
multiple Hawaladars in multiple locations, weaving an intricate web of debt and
interdependence. 13

What problems does Hawala solve?
During an era of financial revolution and upheaval, Hawala seems like a dusty
relic of a bygone era, best left as a footnote in the history of progressively integrating and
digitized global markets. Hawala, however, continues to evolve, adapt and grow to meet
consumer demand for alternative financial transaction services largely because the formal
financial sector has failed to meet consumer needs for money transfer services. 14
There are five major problems with money transfer services of formal financial
institutions such as Western Union and Moneygram: (1) they are not anonymous, (2) they
are expensive, (3) they do not cover a wide enough geographic range, (4) they take too
long and (5) they are not tailored to meet religious or cultural demands. 15 Hawala solves
each one of these dilemmas.

12

Id.
Although unaddressed in the literature, these third parties would seem to be the natural enforcement
mechanism of any dishonest breaches in the money transfer process.
14
The Economist Explains, How Hawala money-transfer schemes are changing, The Economist (Oct. 15,
2015) (explaining how Hawala operators are adapting to Western financial regulation to continue to help
money flow to poor countries were “formal banking is too expensive, heavily regulated, or simply absent”)
15 See Smriti S. Nakhasi, Western Unionizing the Hawala: Privatization of Hawala and Lender Liability,
Northwester J.I.L & B. 27.2 (2007) (outlining the six reasons that Hawala has not been replaced as: (1)
Anonymity, (2) Efficiency, (3) Reliability, (4) Expense, (5) Expansiveness and (6) Religious concerns);
Rachana Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm or A Terrorist Hotbed? 27
Ford. Int’l. L. J, 2007 (2003) (citing efficiency, cost-effectiveness, trust & lack of a paper trail as reasons
why Hawala continues to operate); John F. Wilson, Senior Economist Middle Eastern Department, IMF,
13
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First, illegal Hawala is anonymous. 16 Consumers on both ends of the transaction
may prefer anonymity; the laborer depositing the funds could be in the sending country
illegally or the funds may be used for illegal means such as terrorist financing or money
laundering. Formal financial institutions would not allow these transactions to take place.
Some forms of Hawala are far cheaper than their formal transaction alternatives. 17
On average, Hawaladars charge fees somewhere in the neighborhood of 2%, while
financial institutions may charge closer to 10%. 18 This cost advantage is being undercut
by new FinTech startups, but these startups lack the infrastructure to reach those on the
receiving end of remittance transfers in many developing countries. 19
Western Union, MoneyGram and other traditional international money transfer
services do not have the infrastructure to reach populations in the developing world that
Hawala can. In my conversation with a Philadelphia broker, the broker described how
many of the remittance payments were not being sent to major cities in Africa or South

Remarks for the Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (May 16, 2002)
(stating “Hawala-type informal transfers are often faster, more reliable, reach more destinations, sometimes
benefit from a better exchange rate, and can be much cheaper than transfers through established, licensed
financial institutions.”); Interview with Mamadou, store owner, Touro (Two separate interviews in
February 2016 and May 2016) (describing why his customers use a service other than Western Union or
Moneygram).
16 Legal Hawala, such as Dahabshil, Inc., is not anonymous and requires identification. It still, however,
responds to the other problems raised by formal money transfer systems.
17 An important caveat to this is areas were formal financial institutions do not compete. For example, my
interview with Mamadou revealed that substantial rural populations throughout West Africa do not have
access to international money transfer agents like Western Union. Transfers to these locations may be more
expensive than the fees listed above.
18 Nakhasi at 486 (citing Western Union as charging around 10% on a transaction); Interview with
Mamadou (claiming there was around a 2% transaction fee for many transfers); Interview with store clerk
at Makkah Market (March 2016)(claiming that Western Union would charge around 10% for a small
transaction to Bangladesh);
19 See LTP, This Fintech Start-up is poised to Disrupt the Remittance Space with its $1 Money Transfer
Service, (2014), available at: www.letstalkpayments.com/fintech-start-poised-disrupt-remmitance-space-1/
(describing a start-up which cuts the 5% to 10% cost on remittance transactions to 1%, which is directly
competitive and sometimes cheaper than traditional Hawala pricing). Note that another problem with
FinTech money transfer services is that they leave a permanent financial record of the transaction.
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Asia, but were sent to smaller villages and towns that did not have branches for these
traditional financial companies. 20 The expansive network of brokers, however, could
provide money transfer services to these rural areas were major financial institutions
would not go.
Hawala takes less time than other money transfer systems because the money is
not being physically transferred. Hawala may take less than 24 hours while other transfer
systems like Western Union take closer to 72 hours 21. Even though money may be wired
quickly, the regulatory restrictions in the sending and receiving countries may delay these
transfer payments.
Hawala is compliant with Islamic law and is bound by community ties. Islamic
law has a specific set of rules governing commercial behavior generally, and lending and
financing in particular. 22 Hawala operates not only as a way to send remittance
payments, but also as a form of international financing between communities that
complies with Islamic law. 23 Hawala is an easy and cost-efficient way of brokering this
cross-border financing, whether it is for legal or illicit activities. Equally as importantly,
brokers and their customers often know each other very well and trust one another. Many
are members of the same ethnic communities, share the same religion (Islam) and do
business together on a daily bases. These personal ties play an important role in repeat
business.

20

Interview with Mamadou
Interviews with Mamadou and Makkah Market
22
See Edwina A. Thompson, Misplaced Blame: Islam, Terrorism and the Origins of Hawala, 11 Max
Planck Y.B. U.N.L. 279 (2007) (pointing to Kitab al-Kasab (“On Earning”) and Ar-Riba (“Usury and
Interest”) as regulations that are not broken by Hawala)
23 Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and institutional foundation of the Hawala financial
system, Int’l R. Fin. Analysis (2003); Edwina A. Thompson, Misplaced Blame: Islam, Terrorism and the
Origins of Hawala, 11 Max Planck Y.B. U.N.L. 279 (2007).
21
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Controversies within Hawala: Money Laundering and Terrorism
Hawala rose to prominence in the public’s parlance in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 24. Many commentators and government officials
have highlighted the role that Hawala has played in funding terrorist networks such as
Al-Qaeda. 25 Hawala has been a largely undetectable and untraceable way for terrorist
organizations to launder money and fund their activities. The Treasury Department has
also highlighted the role that Hawala plays in money laundering for non-terrorist
activities. 26
There have been restrictions, driven by the fear of terrorist financing, placed on
Hawala brokers in the United States as well as in foreign countries such as India and
Pakistan. Hawala is legal in Pennsylvania 27, but anyone operating in the money transfer
business in the United States is required to be registered with FinCen 28. Many money
transfer operators in Philadelphia are noticeably absent from this list. 29 Hawala is also

24

See Generally Thompson; Pathak; Priceonomics, Hawala: The Working Man’s Bitcoin (Feb 7,2014):
available at: http://priceonomics.com/hawala-the-working-mans-bitcoin/.
25 Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen, Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview, Perspectives on
Terrorism (2013); Thomas H. Kean & Lee Hamilton. The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, DC:
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004)(highlighting the role that Hawala
plays in funding terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda)
26 See Jost at 12.
27
It is illegal in New Jersey, however, which has a large Muslim immigrant community. Although my
studies did not confirm my suspicion, one would expect that Philadelphia Hawaladars would be natural
beneficiaries of the differences in legality in the two states. In practice, however, I highly suspect that
Hawala continues to operate in New Jersey.
28
See Jost at 11.
29
See 31 CFR 1022.380; See Also https://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msbstateselector.html
(listing all of the registered MSB’s in Philadelphia)
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noticeably Illegal in India and Pakistan, despite its’ widespread prominence in both
nations economies.

3031

The Tenuous legal status of Hawala both in the United States and

abroad does not seemed to have threatened its operation, however, with estimates for the
size of Hawala internationally as high as $415 Billion as late as 2013. 32 Hawala and
other informal remittance systems are estimated to occupy roughly 40% of the global
remittance marketplace.

33

Part II: The “Interviews”
Part II of this paper seeks to explain how Hawala operates and self regulates
through a series of interviews with brokers throughout the Philadelphia area. Much of the
recent literature on Hawala says that it is self-regulating, and suggests that Hawala would
not exist without self-regulation 34. None of the literature, however, has explained beyond
the generic explanations of “self enforcement” and “trust” the mechanisms of
enforcement by the brokers. This article seeks to fill that void by taking an in-depth look
at the brokers of the greater Philadelphia area and their operations.

30

See Jost at 11.
Despite Hawala’s illegality, some estimates suggest that as recently as 2008, after Hawala was
outlawed, it still comprised roughly 40% of India’s GDP and may have accounted for up to $7 billion
dollars in money transfer to Pakistan. See Marie Chêne, Hawala remittance system and money
laundering, u-4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, available at: http://www.u4.no/publications/hawalaremittance-system-and-money-laundering/downloadasset/375.
32 Newsletter from the Anthemis Group, trends in remittances (June 2013) available at:
http://www.anthemis.com/the-anthemis-newsletter-trends-in-remittances-june-2013/
33 Id.
34
See Schramm & Taube (arguing that Hawala is self-regulating and could not exist without selfregulation); Edwina A. Thompson (repeating the idea that Hawala is self regulating)
31
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Methodology
I sought to identify potential Hawala brokers through five different methods: (1) I
emailed or called 12 mosques in the greater Philadelphia area asking if any members of
their congregations were involved in the international money transfer business, (2) I took
five trips between February and May of 2016 to West and North Philadelphia to target
small businessmen in Muslim areas potentially involved in money transfers (3) I called
and visited stores throughout the greater Philadelphia area listed on FinCen’s database of
Money Services Businesses to ask if they were involved in any business similar to
Hawala , (4) I emailed four of the nation’s top scholars on Hawala to ask for
introductions to Hawala brokers and (5) I spoke on the phone with a customer service
representative for Dahabshil, Inc., a legally operating international Hawala broker. 35
I chose Philadelphia because I am a law student at the University of Pennsylvania
and I live in Philadelphia. Philadelphia is a good test case because there are currently
over 200,000 Muslim residents, with perhaps 15% of them first generation immigrants 36.
There are also numerous small Muslim grocers, clothing stores and travel consultants
heavily concentrated in two areas of the city that are easily accessible.
Once I had identified target locations, I sought to meet in person with potential
brokers. I faced a series of major burdens in conducting my research: I was an outsider,
the store owners did not trust me, the questionable legality of Hawala made shop owners
hesitant to admit if they participated in it and it is unclear what exactly constitutes

35

Telephone interview with customer service at Dahabshil, Inc. (April 22, 2016)
Jehron Muhammed, Philly’s Growing Muslim Presence, www.philly.com, November 14, 2014,
available at: http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/jehron_muhammad/Jehron-Muhammad-Muslimsgrowing-presence-in-Philly.html
36
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Hawala. 37 I also found that employees were generally unwilling to speak with me,
perhaps out of fear for their job security.
Regardless of the flaws in my research model, I attempted to build a connection
with each particular storeowner through a systemic routine: I would enter a targeted store,
purchase a small item, comment on any signs about cash money transfers and then inform
the store owner that I was a law student at the University of Pennsylvania conducting
research for a paper on money transfers. If I was able to engage the store owner in
conversation, I would ask them a series of pre-prepared questions.

38

I was unable to find success with three of my five methods used. 39 After
purchasing twenty-two boxes of Gunpowder tea, three bags of Fonio and two bottles of
shockingly cheap cardamom, I found two business owners and one employee that were
involved in money exchanges outside of traditional financial institutions that were willing
to speak with me, who I will refer to throughout the Part II as West Philadelphia

37

There are different names in different communities for Hawala, and there are numerous types of informal
money transfer regimes. For this papers sake, I assumed that any money transfer system that operated like
Hawala constituted Hawala, even if the storeowner did not call the money transfer system that they
participated in Hawala.
38
I asked each storeowner or employee nine basic questions and than followed up with individualized
questions depending on the direction of the conversation. The nine questions I asked were: (1) What types
of money transfer systems do you operate in your store?, (2) What locations do you serve?, (3) Do you
have a relationship with your customers, (4) Are your customers repeat users of your services, (5) How
frequent are customer transactions? , (6) How large is each transaction?, (7) What is the process behind
each transaction?, (8) How familiar are you with brokers on the receiving end of the transaction? and (9) Is
there any concern of breach or theft by the other brokers? Following these nine questions, I would follow
up with a variation of: “Do you use an alternative forms of money transfer systems?” if their answer to
question 1 was unclear.
39
I received responses from two Mosques but no small business owner involved in money transfer was
willing to be interviewed. I found the FinCen database unhelpful because every store registered on the
Money Services Business Registration webpage that I visited was owned by “absentee” owners that were
not present during the day-to- day operations of the business. Employees of these businesses were
unwilling to speak with me, it seemed out of fear that their discussion with me would be a breach of
protocol. Emails with Hawala scholars were equally unfruitful, with perhaps the most helpful advice
coming from Professor Nikos Passas, who suggested that I “try to find some South Asian who could
introduce me to a Hawala broker.” Email from Nikos Passas, Professor of criminology and criminal justice,
Northeastern University, Co-director of Institute for Security and Public Policy (April 11, 2016, 5:08 PM
EST).
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Hawaladar (WPH) 40, North Philadelphia Hawaladar (NPH) 41 and the Soap Hawaladar
(SH) 42. 43
WPH is the owner of a small Muslim oriented West African grocery store in West
Philadelphia 44. His primary business is his grocery store, but he also operates a money
transfer business out of his grocery store. He proudly displays an “Anti-Money
Laundering” certificate on the wall of his store and informed me that money transfers
make up an “important” part of his business, but he was unwilling to reveal exactly how
much. Despite his certificate, his store is noticeably absent from the FinCen Money
Services Business database. 45 WPH was unique in offering all cash money transfer to
locations throughout both Sub-Saharan Africa and certain parts of South Asia. No ID was
required for any transfer under $1,000 46, and no trace other than a receipt of the money
transfer would exist, but WPH assured me that the businessman on the other end
receiving the transfer was trustworthy and reputable. WPH even told me that he used a
broker in his native country to send $200 a month home to pay for his children’s
schooling.

40

Interview with Mamadou, store owner, Touro (Two separate interviews in February 2016 and May
2016)
41 Interview with store owner, Multi Service, (March 2016)
42 Interview with store employee, Scensational Boutiqe (April 2016)
43
As I was driving home from my second interview through the winding and decrepit streets of
Franklinville I could not help but become a disciple of the old adage “better lucky than good.”
44 My interviews with WPH took place over the course of two encounters in February and May. During my
initial interview, Mamadou, the owner with whom I conducted the interviews, was willing to admit to
operating an “alternative” form of money transfer system but in my follow up interview in May when a
customer was present he only mentioned the existence of three forms of money transfer services offered
that were not Moneygram or Western Union and was far less willing to discuss the details of each
transaction. I suspect that this was a result of a customer being present.
45
A common theme, as not a single business owner that actually spoke to me was registered with FinCen
despite the requirement that anyone involved in Hawala or similar services register.
46
I am highly skeptical that an ID was required for any money transfer over this amount. I witnessed a man
hand the cashier a large stack of bills wrapped in a rubber band that appeared to be above $1,000 and this
man was never asked for his identification.
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NPH was the owner of a small, Muslim oriented grocer and convenience store in
North Philadelphia. NPH offered Western Union services out of his store, but upon
further discussion admitted that he also offered a cash only alternative money transfer
system to Pakistan for some of his customers. Although he did not explicitly call the
money transfer system Hawala, the transfer system he described was almost an exact
replica of the Hawala model I described in Part I.
SH was an employee at a tiny, Muslim oriented store that sold specialty soaps but
that also offered money transfer and cash checking services. SH was willing to describe
the normal users of the money transfer services, the locations that they serviced and how
often the users would send money but did not have knowledge of the details of the
service provided. SH did claim, however, that they used an independent money transfer
service for transfers to West Africa.

Who Participates?
WPH, NPH and SH described a remarkably similar set of users of their broker
services. All three had regular, repeat and well-known customers that would consistently
send a small amount of money, often bi-weekly or monthly, to family members in their
home countries. The amounts would vary, but according to all three brokers were almost
overwhelmingly under $1,000 (and according to WPH often closer to $100). WPH did
concede in his second interview, however, that some of the transfers were in the
thousands of dollars, but said that because of IRS regulations he did take down the ID
and Social Security number of these transferees. Both parties would give “receipts” to
senders, but in essence there was no record of the transactions, no ID required and no
physical transfer of money. In the instances of WPH and NPH, the receivers of the

13

transaction would be able to withdraw the foreign currency in the receiving country
within one to three days. 47
WPH and NPH used different types of brokers on the receiving end of the
transaction; NPH was familiar with the receivers but was not a relative of any of them.
According to NPH’s account of where he could send money, the receivers were
geographically dispersed in multiple regions of Pakistan. WPH slightly differed, in that
he was a cousin of one receiver who he used consistently, but was not related to any other
receiver brokers. All of the brokers involved were men, and the overwhelming majority
of users of the system were men. Only WPH was willing to share how many transactions
took place in his shop each month, which he estimated to be well over 100. 48
WPH serviced customers sending money primarily to Sub-Saharan Africa and
Bangladesh. He explicitly stated he did not send any money to either Egypt or Sudan. He
told me “someone else” handled those transactions, and guessed that those senders would
use either Western Union or a storeowner from one of those areas to send the money.
NPH was unwilling to reveal his customer base beyond the fact that he did send money to
Pakistan and other parts of South Asia, although he would not reveal were. SH had a very
diverse customer base ranging from South Asia to West Africa to the Caribbean & Latin
America. She did mention that the users from West Africa would use a different money
transfer service than those from the Caribbean, but did not give any further information.

47

SH did not know how long it would take for the receivers to be able to withdraw the money but estimated
within a day.
48 He would not give me an exact figure, so I asked him: “would you estimate that you had over 100
transactions each month” and he said yes. I then asked him if he had over 200 and he shrugged, indicating
that 200 transactions a month was possible.
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The Economics of Hawala in Greater Philadelphia
The Philadelphia marketplace for money transfer is a mixed system of a perfectly
competitive marketplace and monopoly, with a wide variety of services and prices
offered.
The prices of the MoneyGram and Western Union services offered ranged
anywhere from 5.9% to 10%, depending upon the region of transfer. 49 Prices for the
“alternative” services offered by NPH and WPH ranged from a $20 flat fee on transfers
up to $1,000 (with a declining percentage fee on transfers above that amount) to a flat 2%
on all transfers.

50

In both instances, the alternative transfer system was cheaper than

Western Union or MoneyGram.
The estimated arrival times for the funds in the alternative transfer systems were
both shorter than their respective traditional financial service counterparts. Western
Union was far faster than the literature reported in the late 2000s, estimating delivery in
72 hours, but informal transfers remain swifter (perhaps because no money is actually
being transferred). The price difference between the two products seems to be the most
substantial current difference.
There are countless store in the Philadelphia area offering money transfer
services. Virtually every ethnic grocery store that I visited offered some form of money
transfer services. I highly suspect that many of the grocers who would not speak with me
offered other, alternative, money transfer services that are only advertised to their wellknown customers. The literature has consistently highlighted the prominence of non-

49
50

Interview with Makkah Market, Interview with YFR, April (2016)
Interview with WPH, Interview with NPH
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English advertisements of these services, and there is little reason that Philadelphia would
be an exception to this rule. 51 The availability to transfer money to major urban areas is
limitless.
WPH’s service, however, highlighted how brokers can have a near monopoly on
certain transfer locations. One shortfall of the traditional money transfer systems like
Western Union is that they are not available in less populated or less financially
connected regions of the world. WPH mentioned that his alternative service was available
in some regions where Western Union was not located (he mentioned multiple locations
in Senegal, Chad, Nigeria and Mali, for example). I was unable to find another store that
offered widespread money transfer services to this particular area of West Africa, so I
suspect that WPH had a virtual monopoly on this small subset of the population in
Philadelphia seeking to transfer money to this region. The high fee (twenty dollars)
charged on the alternative service suggests that while there are competitive pressures on
money transfer services to major urban areas, more rural or geographically isolated
regions have the potential to be profit centers for these brokers.

Enforcement
NPH and WPH both had different takes on the “enforcement” mechanism of
Hawala due to the slight differences in the systems that they offered. WPH first was
confident in the trustworthiness and honor of those brokers receiving the money transfer.
He even used a broker to send money to his children. WPH seemed genuinely shocked at
the question whether another broker would steal the transferred money. His comments
explained why the systems’ “honor code” seems to work. First, none of the brokers
51

See Post.

16

involved in the transactions participate in Hawala as their primary business. Instead,
money transfer is an ancillary service offered to their normal, repeat customers. Second,
the money transfer amounts are small, so any potential theft would bring a limited gain.
Third, if WPH did not know the broker on the other end, someone in the network almost
certainly did. Maintaining a positive word of mouth reputation is incredibly important for
all brokers, so that one will continue to use the others’ service.
In the event there was some form of theft, WPH confirmed that economic and
social isolation would occur. Any such theft would leave a broker entirely cut off from
any future transactions, but equally as importantly the traditional business of the broker
would suffer. The customers of the lying broker would simply leave and use another
grocery store or convenience store, as well as another broker. The economic benefits for
theft are miniscule, while the potential costs are substantial. WPH was unaware of any
theft of transferred money taking place from the brokers.
NPH was far less willing to discuss the mechanics of the transfer system, but
suggested that he would stop doing business with the thief and that a third party would
cut off the lying broker. NPH’s description strongly suggests that he participates in a far
more densely populated money transfer network, with a third party operating to balance
the transfer books between the multiple brokers participating. This third party operator is
consistent with the description described in Part I by Nikos Passas’ of outside, larger
parties operating in the balancing of broker books. 52 It seems from NPH’s comments that
the smaller players free-ride off of the enforcement powers of a larger third party, but that
the enforcement capabilities of these third parties to shut off lying brokers are substantial.
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Both conversations confirmed the consensus in the literature that (1) trust is a
highly valued commodity in the Hawala community, (2) reputation matters and (3) the
network of brokers is self-enforcing by either individual members or powerful market
actors 53. In addition, the apparently limited economic upside of theft gives little actual
incentive for theft. Cultures of honor and trust also seem to play an enormous role (both
brokers seemed to take enormous pride in their honor, and where offended at the notion
of theft existing). Religion was not brought up as a factor, but inevitably permeated the
conversation (all three stores were Muslim oriented).

Dahabshiil, Inc
I have separated my conversation with the customer service representative at
Dahabshiil, Inc. into a separate section because my interaction as a consumer was so
radically different. Dahabshiil is a major international legal Hawala broker that operates
through a series of “agents” or brokers in 126 countries. 54 They operate through a
network of affiliated brokers throughout the United States and encompass all of the
advantages of Hawala that the other brokers did. Their fees were higher than illegal
Hawala (I was quoted 6% for a money transfer to Ethiopia) 55, but they are lower than the
10% Western Union fee. Dahabshiil also presumably did not maintain the same
community ties as illegal Hawala and the money transfers are not anonymous. However,
they still encompass the remaining advantages of Hawala: They are fast, they cover wide
geographic areas and they are compliant with Islamic legal maxims on finance.
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Dahabshiil, https://www.dahabshiil.com/ (last visited May 1, 2016)
55 Interview with customer service representative at Dahabshiil
54

18

My conversation with the customer service representative was what could be
expected of a conversation with any major multinational financial institution such as
Western Union. They would not share any information on users of their services and
were only willing to say that the broker in Ethiopia was a member of their wider network
of affiliated agents. This corporate, multi-national Hawala is a substantially different
player than WPH, NPH or SH. Cheating is unlikely to occur with their brokers because as
affiliates they would be expelled from the formal Dahabshiil network if they stole.

Part III: The Literature
Why does Hawala work?
To some, it may seem puzzling why Hawala continues to operate. There is no
formal enforcement mechanism for breaches, there is no access to a court system to
enforce contractual claims and the interaction between individual Hawaladars is often
limited to a phone call. Despite these shortcomings, a series of incentives have developed
that have created a form of extra-legal self-regulation. This self-regulation has emerged
because (1) Hawala networks share similarities with the economics of clubs and (2) trust
& honor have created incentives which discourage breaches.
Extralegal Self Regulation
Extralegal self-regulation can naturally emerge amongst groups and industries
when there are proper incentives. Linda Bernstein’s pioneering work uncovering the
extralegal enforcement mechanisms of the New York diamond industry offers some key
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insights into what type of factors need to be present. 56 The diamond industry, according
to Bernstein, was built upon the twin pillars of reputation and trust. The prominence of
repeat players and religious and ethnic similarities combined with these two pillars
created the proper incentives for extra-legal self-regulation.
Avner Grief’s article on contract enforceability amongst the ancient Maghribi
offers another compelling example of what incentives are required for extralegal
contractual enforcement. 57 Here, the traders operated a far-flung merchant coalition that
allowed financing and trade in the 11th century Mediterranean world. This Maghribi
trader’s system was also built on reputation and trust, which was re-enforced by repeat
players and religious ties. The system’s dependence on distant brokers, word of mouth
networks and trust in the money transfer business mimicked modern Hawala.
Hawala shares many of the characteristics described by Bernstein and Grief: Both
the literature and the interviewed brokers highlighted the importance of trust & honor, the
users of illegal Hawala are close nit and often share religious or ethnic ties and Islam
permeates all of the transactions. Some markets, it seems, do not need government to
effectively self-regulate.
The Economics of Clubs
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Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
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practiced community punishment, and ostracized agents who were considered cheaters.”)
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Clubs are described by James Buchanan as “consumption ownership-membership
arrangement[s]”. 58 Club members create rules of self-regulation so that club commodities
are not depleted. In Hawala, trust is a commodity or club good 5960. The “trust”
commodity shared by Hawaladars is neither a purely private nor a purely public good.
The trust produced between the parties has the private good characteristic of being
individually created and consumed but the public good characteristic of benefiting or
hurting all members depending on how much trust is either re-enforced or breached. The
members of the club, in this case the Hawala brokers, have an incentive to self-regulate
their club so that other members do not deplete the “trust” commodity for all the other
brokers.
The network of Hawaladars is also similar to clubs in other ways. The benefit of
additional members can serve to reduce costs faced by a single person (for example,
balancing of accounts will be easier with more operators as will the attraction of
customers). There are also potential “crowding costs” if the club becomes too big, as
enforcement of trust can become more difficult as Hawaladar operators become more
dispersed and culturally heterogeneous.
Trust and Honor
The literature has universally highlighted the importance of “trust” and “honor” as
being crucial to Hawala’s operation. 61 If there is not trust between the brokers and the
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customers, no one would use Hawala. This trust commodity is crucial to the networks
functioning. Partha Dasgupta’s paper on “Trust” as a commodity argues that if there is
an absence of “suitable punishment” for breaking agreements, individuals will not
possess the appropriate incentives to fulfill their obligations. 62 The threat of punishment
for breaches must be credible, and the enforcement agent must be trustworthy. When
trust is a club good like in Hawala, strong incentives develop to create “suitable
punishment” for those who breach.
Honor of the Hawala brokers also plays a crucial role in creating incentives to not
breach agreements with customers or other brokers. WPH seemed genuinely offended at
the idea of anyone stealing from a money transfer in his network. 63 Basic human
decency, but also esteem seeking, may play a major role in encouraging enforcement of
contracts for money transfers. 64
Whether it is the incentives created by the economics of clubs, the importance of
trust and honor, or a combination of the two, conditions clearly exist that allow Hawala
to flourish even without a formal, legal enforcement mechanisms. It seems that informal
enforcement is sufficient to allow the operation of Hawala.

HAWALA System in India, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, The, 15 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 619,
654 (2004-2005); Nikos Passas, Demystifying Hawala: A look into its social organization and mechanics,
7.1 J. Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention. 46,52 (2006); Matthias Schramm &
Markus Taube, Evolution and institutional foundation of the Hawala financial system, Int’l R. Fin.
Analysis (2003)
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Dasgupta, Partha. Trust as a commodity Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations 49-72 (2000)
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WPH spoke with passion how most of the money being transferred was for school, medicine or food. He
saw himself as performing a vital function to local members of his community both in Philadelphia and to
the family members of the senders back home. He clearly thought that theft from either group would be
dishonorable.
64 See Generally Richard H. McAdams, Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, The, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 338, 433 (1997-1998) (highlighting the importance of “esteem seeking” by actors in the enforcement
of norms)(esteem seeking could also be at play with refusal to steal from one’s own community)
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Part IV: Conclusion and the Future of Hawala
A drive through the streets of Franklinville & Fairhill shows a Philadelphia far
removed from the comforts of an Ivy League law campus. Here, beneath the dilapidated
urban exoskeleton of North Philadelphia lies a rich and vibrant network of immigrant
communities, globally connected to their home countries through friends, neighbors and
merchants. Hawala is the financial artery of this network, delivering untraceable funds
throughout the entire world in mere minutes. Regulatory crackdowns and rising
competition have barely placed a dent in the multi-billion dollar informal financial
transfer system industry that is so popular amongst this immigrant community. As long as
there is demand for fast, discreet and cheap forms of money transfers, Illegal Hawala will
continue to remain a major market player throughout the globally dispersed Muslim
world for the foreseeable future.
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